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ETHICS, PSYCHOLOGY AND TUE CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY OF TUE INSANE
S. S. GLUECKa
I.

WHAT IS THE PROBLEm, AND Is IT OF PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE?

Discussing the argument for freedom of will that rests on the
theological doctrine that since God is sovereign "the will of man is in
the bondage of necessity," Dugald Stewart is said to have observed,
"There is a fallacy here somewhere, but the devil himself can't find it."
A study of the arguments for and against freedom of will, no matter
what these rest on, is likely to convince the student sooner or later
that Stewart's observation might well be applied to almost all, if not all,
.the arguments on both sides of the question. For it is of the very
essence of this riddle of the Sphinx that there- are good arguments on
both sides, and that it must always remain unanswerable. Further, it
seems that the "good arguments" derive their force largely from a lack
of clearness and corisistency in use of terminology. In discussing this
problem, therefore, we must especially remember that a name is not a

description.
The ethical foundations of the question of criminal responsibility

cannot be ignored entirely. It is common for writers on criminology
and penology to assert that criminal, as moral, responsibility rests on
"freedom of will" in the metaphysical sense of ultimate, unmotivated,
free activity, 1 or to deny it such a basis, and to consider they have thus
paid sufficient respect to the ethical implications of their problem.
Those writers who insist that freedom of will is at the basis of criminal responsibility assume that, confronted by two or more alternative
courses of action, the criminal is he who has deliberately chosen the
illegal course, and who, by the same token, could deliberately have
chosen the path of virtue. But the relationship of freedom of will, in
aA. M., L. L. M., 141 Summit Ave., Brookline, Mass.
1
There are numerous definitions of "freedom" and "determinism," depending largely upon varying opinions as to the "degree" of freedom. Few today
seriously insist either that human activity is entirely free in the sense that "a
movement of the will" is a "bolt from the blue," or, the other extreme, that all
human action is inevitably and to the same degree determined by mechanical
laws. Professor Hornets "Free Will and Human Responsibility" gives a pithy
summary of the definitions of the terms and the arguments pro and con. The
view of "freedom" taken in these pages is-the capacity of human beings for
conscious, purposive activity in the light of past experience and in conformity
with some intelligently conceived plan.
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the metaphysical sense, to criminal responsibility is only partial and
vague, and this for two reasons. In the first place, while it is true that
historically punishment has been justified at one or another on the
theory -of a society of free-willing individuals, this view of "freedom"
has gradually been modified. Conforming to the findings of psychological, anthropological and sociological science after the advent of the
Positive School of Criminology, most writers do not use the term "freedom of will" in its 18th and 19th century meaning. Freedom as conceived of today does not rule out other causative factors, such as
hereditary constitution and environmental factors. Today it is championed by the Mentalist School of Psychology as meaning the capacity
of a human being to act creatively and purposefully, albeit under the
influence of motives, and within certain necessary limitations. This
seems also to be its meaning when the term is used by judges and by
commentators on the criminal law, such as Wharton and Stephen. But
it should be pointed out that this view is also designated by some as
"determinism," or "scientific determinism"--a practice which has contributed to make "confusion worse confounded" in this field.
The second reason why the relation of freedom of will in the
metaphysical sense to criminal responsibility is only partial is that no
one view of the rationale of punishment seems, on examination, to have
held exclusive sway in our law after the law had reached the stage of
a developed system; so that punishment was not always based exclusively on the belief that the basis of criminal responsibility is freedom
of will, even when that expression meant absolutely free, unmotivated
action; other reasons for punishment blended with this belief.
Writers on the criminal responsibility of the special class of insane
offenders also treat at length of "freedom of will" and its relation to
the legal guilt of the insane, when what they are usually discussing is
the more or less normal conscious, purposive activity of human beings,
and the influence of mental disease or defect in disturbing this human
capacity for rational, purposive conduct. To attempt to catalogue the
numerous writings on the various angles of this subject would be for
our purpose a needless occupation. But some consideration of the
principal arguments on the freedom of will question seems necessary
as a metaphysico-psychological foundation for what is to follow.
This troublesome question might be avoided entirely by a statement from Professor Wharton: "It may be possible that from a high
metaphysical point of vision all acts are necessitated. With this, how'2
ever, jurisprudence, which is a practical science, has nothing to do."
2Philosophy of Criminal Law, Philadelphia, Kay & Bro., 1880, Note p. 53.

210

S. S. GLUECK

While this statement is true, many would consider the metaphysical
problem as of the very essence of an inquiry into the bases of the
criminal responsibility of the insane, because, as Mr. F. H. Bradley
pertinently 'asks in criticism: of Doctor Mandsley's classical "Responsibility in Mental Disease," "How in the world is it possible to say what
relieves a madman of responsibility unless you know what makes a
sane man responsible? Unless a man is agreed with us as to our main
beliefs as to a sane man's responsibility, how can we receive his evidence as to anyone's non-responsibility ?-3
The logic of Mr. Bradley's queries cannot be denied. But we
must be clear as to the meaning of our concepts and as to what the law
is actually attempting to do. The truth is that the law, following
common sense and common morality, assumes a certain degree of
freedom of conscious, purposive activity possessed by the ."normal"
mind. It disregards the metaphysical question, which is concerned
with ultimate truth, on the ground that such an ultimate answer cannot be obtained and turned to immediate practical use in the courts.
Nevertheless, we cannot overlook the metaphysics of our problem; for
it cannot be denied that philosophical considerations have had some
part in shaping legal concepts. Further, while the law is concerned
with what is, those who hope to reform the law must give some thought
to what ought to be. At any rate, we cannot throw over both metaphysics and psychology, as Oppenheimer does, 4 and proceed "feeling
lighter for having thrown overboard the metaphysical ballast." His
argument and justification for barring both ethics and psychology from
his discussion are not convincing. While we agree that, as he says,
criminal responsibility is a legal concept, it is difficult to see how the
objective legal responsibility can be established without a reference to
the subjective mental state of the defendant; nor how we can avoid
comparing these states which resulted in the illegal act with what the
law declares desirable on the part of citizens. True enough, if "Parliament enact tomorrow that lunacy be no longer recognized as a defense to a criminal charge, B., a hopeless madman, will escape punishment if tried today, but he will be held responsible and made to feel the
full severity of the law if tried after the new Act has come into operation"; and true, further, as Oppenheimer says, "Criminal responsibility
is a term of positive law, of law as it is, not as it ought to be." Neverthe less, the fact is that the law, as it is today, provides that insanity
under certain conditions comprising a sufficient degree to constitute
3Ethical Studies, p. 44, Note 1.
4
The Criminal Responsibility of Lunatics, p. 5.
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lack of criminal responsibility, does exempt from guilt; and it is impossible to prove insanity by external behavior alone.
We are therefore justified in examining the metaphysics and psychology of the question. Owing to a widespread difference of opinion
as to terminology, one is ever apt, in a discussion of this sort, to incur
the criticism that was directed against the author of a work on "The
Secret of Hegel," to the effect that the author had succeeded admirably
in keeping Hegel's secret. Nevertheless, it is the purpose herein first
to indicate the various and inconsistent senses in which the two important terms, freedom of will and determinism, have been usedwhich can best be done by considering the views of some ethicists as
to the practical importance of this philosophical question in our social
institutions and daily life; secondly, these questions will be related to
the consideration of the pertinent data of the two leading schools of
psychology-the Mentalist and the Behaviorist. Next, the relation of
freedom in the sense of conscious, purposive activity to theories of
punishment will be considered. Further, other bases for penal treatment, presumably ignoring consideration of freedom in the psychological sense, will be shown to depend on this. Finally, we will attempt
to sketch a basis of penal treatment which takes account both of the
nature of man and his interests, and of the interests of a legally ordered
society.
First, what is the practical bearing today of this mefaphysical
speculation on the problem confronting legally organized society of
dealing with its transgressors? If we consider the views of some
ethicists as to the practical importance of the metaphysical problem in
the field of criminal law, we must conclude that it cannot be of great
significance, if for no other reason than that so much difference of
opinion has always existed, and still persists, as to the meaning of the
terms. The metaphysicists and ethicists of course insist that it does
make a great difference in practical affairs whether we believe in freedom of will or determinism; yet strangely enough it is not uncommon
to find both free-willists and determinists claiming for their respective
camps the philosophical basis of, all social institutions, and, stranger
still, a view that one protagonist enthusiastically advocates as "determinism" and as therefore constituting the foundation of morals and
law, another cheerfully appropriates as "freedom," and by the same
logic, insists that it underlies all our institutions. Each side seems to
select an extreme statement of the other's views as the points of departure in order triumphantly to indicate that it leads to a reductio ad
absurdajn; and it is not unusual to find one definition of terms at the
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beginning of a book and quite the opposite at the end. In view of this
situation it is not surprising that much arguing has been at cross-purposes. If our definition of the terms seems arbitrary to some, it is
hoped that at least it will have the merit of consistency.
Considering now some typical views as to the practical importance
of this question, we find that Professor Home, in his succinct summary of the arguments for and against freedom of will, asserts: "Determinism would affect our views of punishment in home, school, and
state. Punishment would be not so much retributive as preventive in
nature and purpose; it would look not toward the past and the return
of the deed on the doer but toward the future and the determining
(italics ours) of the child or criminal away from the repetition of the
misdeed. In our courts .of justice the tendency is in fact in the direction of blaming heredity, -environment, associations, training, and the
like, rather than the man himself, for his misconduct."'
Before analyzing this passage, let us examine the sense in which
Professor Home uses the terms "freedom" and "determinism." More
careful in his argument than many writers on this elusive subject, he
6
attempts clearly to definite the issue between freedom and determinism.
He distinguishes no less than twelve types of concepts of freedom, and
finally accepts the position that freedom means "to act in either of two
or more .vays contemplated." On this he says, "This view suggests
the questions: Can'a man do differently from what he does do Could
any different thing ever have been done by anybody than that which
they did do? Is the future of each individual already written in the
nature of things, or 'in his forehead'? as the Mohammedans say? Is
some such force as fate, or predestination, or necessity, or heredity,
or environment, or any or all of these an adequate- explanation of the
events of an individual's life without reference to any ability of his
own to do otherwise than he does do?

.

.

.

To all these questions

the determinists answer man and society are determined by efficient
causes working out but one inevitable result; the free-willists answer
man and society co-operate with the efficient causes in shaping themselves partly at least toward their own ends.

.

.

.

To the free-

willist the possible is one of several things that mgy be made to happen, and the actual is the one thing that did happen or was made to
happen. To the determinist the future is as fixed as the past, to the
free-willist the future is not fixed, but is in process of being fixed by
5
Free Will and Human Responsibility, Herman Hanell Horne, N. Y., The
Macmillan Co., 1912, pp. 173, 174.
8
1d., pp. 64, 66.
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the choices men make in the present. To the determinist the sense of
th evitable is delusory, to the free-willist the sense of the inevitable is
delusory. . . . Both cannot be right. Either all events are determined or some events are not determined, there is no middle ground.
Determinism holds the former position; libertarianism the latter. The issue could not be more sharply drawn."
After this clear statement of the respective positions, Professor
Home seems, in the first passage quoted, to lapse into the inconsistency
that characterizes many discussions of this subject. For to regard the
determinists as "determining the child or criminal away. from the repetition of the misdeed" is to assume that individuals are capable of
acting between "two or more ways contemplated," and, therefore, to
assume freedom in the sense defined by Professor Home himself. If
all things have been determined, if "some such force as fate, or predestination, or necessity, or heredity, or environment, or any or all of
these" is "an adequate explanation of the events of an individual's life
without reference to any ability of his own tQ do otherwise than he
does do," if "the future is as fixed as the past," then how can we consistently say that the practical difference that the deterministic position
makes is in "determining of the child or criminal away from the repetition of the misdeed"? If "to the determinist the future is as fixed
as the past," then all effort to make the criminal consciously control
the future is futile. Is Home not here assuming the position of the
free-willist? Or is there not here one of those, fallacies that Dugald
Stewart puts beyond the ken of "the devil himself"?
Again, McConnell and others appropriate all the features of modern penology for the determinist. Thus McConnell writes: "The conclusion to be drown from the acceptance of determinism is that the
determining causes of crime should be sought and found and removed,
or at least attenuated as much as possible. . . . Punishment is to be
administered not as an end in itself but as a medicine, a therapeutic
treatment, appropriate for the particular individual, and calculated to
better his condition and to render him inoffensive, to cure him of his
malady and to restore him to society as constructive instead of destructive. _ . . The deterministic conception regards people as being
only what they must be by virtue of inheritance and experience.
It takes people as they are, and admits that they could not be different.
On this account, it feels an indulgence and sympathy which forgives
the past, and looks forward with hope to the future. ' 7 This is- the
7
Criminal Responsibility and Social Constraint, Ray Madding McConnell,
New York, Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1912, p. 130.
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same view of determinism as described by Horne, and the argument is
open to the same objections.
To show that diametrically opposite views of the relation of determinism to penology have been held, we quote the following from Professor Tarde's Penal Philosophy, calling attention especially to the last
sentence:
I cannot agree with Fonesgrive that the penal law must
practically remain the same, whether we do or do not 'admit of free
will. 'Like determinist legislation,' says he in his interesting essay on
Free Will, 'the legislator who is a partisan of free will will take measures of precaution against the violent madman. Both will be more
severe in proportion to the perversity shown by actions: only what one
will call perversity of will, the other will call perversity of nature.'
But the legislator who is a partisan of free will ought the more readily
to excuse, and to punish and blame the guilty man the less, as this man
shall have been driven by a more violent inclination, or by a more
perverse nature; the determinist legislator will do exactly the opposite.
For example, Fonesgrive is perfectly right in saying elsewhere that the
legislator who is a partisan of free will would be more inclined always
to hope for the possibility of an improvement in the most perverse,
and as a consequence to prohibit irrevocable penalties, the death penalty
above all others.""
From the foregoing it will be seen that opposite stands on the
questions of freedom and determinism can lead to the same practical
conclusions as to penology. The above illustrates the views of those
who insist that the metaphysical -question is bound up with our more
or less permanent social institutions-our broad, social policies, such
as the criminal law and penological treatment. Some also stress the
importance of the metaphysical question in influencing the acts of public officials in their daily occupations within those social institutions.
Thus McConnell holds that "practical action is bound to be modified
by the view which anyone takes on this matter of freedom or determinism. Whenever a determinist regards an act, he feels justified in
inquiring for its causes. He looks for the motives which determined
the will of the actor. The free-willist, on the -contrary, may think
such a procedure useless. He thinks that the will was free, and not
necessitated by antecedent events. * .
A drunkard is arrested and
brought up for trial. The determinist judge says, 'This man inherited
an uncontrollable thirst for alcohol; he rieeds to go to a sanatorium for
treatment and cure.' The free-willist judge asserts, 'It does not make
8P. 16, Note.
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any difference how many generations of this man's ancestors drank
whisky; he need not have drunk it, and ought not to have drunk it.
Let him be punished with the maximum imprisonment.' "0
Assuming that the author's use of terms is justifiable, has Doctor
McConnell correctly described the judge's psychology? In other words,
are the daily decisions of judges the result exclusively of their personal
views on our metaphysical question? First of all, the argument
assumes that inquiry into motives of action-the duty of psychologyis limited to the determinist (or, what he is likely to be in the field of
psychology, the "mechanist").
But aside from this, it is doubtful
whether judges really decide cases on the basis of their metaphysical
views as to freedom or determinism. The judge of the illustration,
like everybody else (determinist or free-willist) consciously or subconsciously considered the act and its surrounding circumstances in
relation to the individual and in the light of his own sentiments,, complexes, judgment. and ethical views (which latter are not necessarily
built upon any definite opinion as to human freedom or determinism).
If anyone doubt this, let him read Judge Cardozo's excellent little work
on the "Nature of the Judicial Process."'"
The metaphysical views of
McConnell's judge might have been one of the influencing factors in
the decision, but one of many, and that one vague, and indirect as the
terms of the metaphysical argument themselves are. vague. Many
influences obviously entered into the judge's decision,'all comprising
his own picture as to the end and aim of the criminal law: His personality traits, his whole upbringing, the news he might have read at
the breakfast table as to the prevalence of extreme drunkenness in the
community, the way his breakfast suited him, the stuffiness of the
courtroom and his desire to dispose of the case quickly, the appearance
of the defendant, his past record, and so on. It is not inconceivable
even that nothing but the caprice of the judge decided the outcome. 1
Besides, even if the judge's views as to the reformability of the defendant greatly influenced the decision, and even if we assume that
these views were the conscious result of his reasoning on the question
of "freedom of will," it is just as easy and quite as logical for the
judge to have arrived at exactly the opposite conclusions from those
attributed to him by Doctor McConnell. Thus, if he were a freeOCriminal
Responsibility and Social Constraint, p. 130.
' 0Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, New I-raven,
Yale University Press, p. 167.
"See Schroeder, Theo., "The Psychological Study of Judicial Opinion," Cal.
Law Rev., Jan., 1918, Vol. VI, No. 2, pp. 89-113. See also Geo. Everson, "The
Human Element in Justice," Jour. Amer. Inst. Crim. Law and Criminology,
May, 1919.
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willist, while his views might have made him believe the defendant
voluntarily chose the path of evil and could just as voluntarily have
refrained, they might also have influenced him in believing that through
corrective treatment the defendant could be taught to choose the right
course of action when temptation again presented itself. On the other
hand, instead of his deterministic views "determining" him to send the
man who inherited "an uncontrollable -thirst for alcohol" to a sanatorium for treatment and cure, he might have argued that as this
"thirst" was "determined" it was futile to attempt to change it by
treatment, for that would require the exercise of "freedom of will" on
the part of the patient, and freedom of will is by the definition of
determinism excluded from the argument.
From all this we see that, first, the influence of the metaphysical
question, as it is usually defined by ethicists, either on broad social
policy or on the actions of individual judges is greatly exaggeratedi
and, secondly, that because of confusion of terms, almost diametrically
opposite conclusions can be reached from either of the premises.
Some insist that without "freedom of will' ethics and the other
social sciences must fall; for, runs the argument, if the will is not
free, there can be no such thing as "moral responsibility," and therefore no criminal responsibility that is founded on justice. But the fact
that both views and many variations and confusions of them are existing side by side with responsibility is sufficient refutation of that
position.
To all that has gone before it may be objected by some that we
have not stated the respective views of the determinist'and free-willist,
in our examples, in the orthodox way in which they themselves would
use those terms. It has already been shown that some-writers define
,their positions clearly at the outset, but lapse into inconsistences in the
development of their arguments. A closer examination of the position
of "scientific determinism" will disclose the fallacy upon rwhich it
rests; and a re-statement Qf the true position of the modern believer in
"free will" as capacity for conscious, purposive activity will serve to
clarify the situation.
The modern "determinists" take refuge in a metaphysical sitting
on the fence. They wish to be "scientific" and to stamp with approval
the remarkable findings of modem science. They believe that these
discoveries point conclusively to the "universal sway of causality" in
the universe. They insist that both inquiry into motives of human
action and the recognition of apparent causality in the mechanical
world are exclusively their province. At the same time they wish to
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retain something of the "dignity of man," and they feel vaguely that
there is something inconsistent in the position of the agitator who
insists that all things are determined with mechanical rigor, but who
nevertheless vigorously swims against the tide of this relentless deterrinism in all he does and says. Some of them cannot, in spite of the
brilliant evidences of mechanistic "causality" adduced by the physical
and natural sciences, rule out the data of introspection, especially the
universal feeling and consciousness of capacity for purposive, free
activity. Some of them speak of "freedom" as an "illusion, apparently
not troubling themselves as to whether their arbitrary notion that freedom-is an illusion might not in itself be an illusion.
Such "scientific determinists" point out that they do not take the
fatalistic position that there is a power external to ourselves and no
matter how we struggle the predetermined event will happen to us;
that they do not say with the Mohammedan, "It is the will of Allah";
that they do not believe in the inevitable fatalism of the Greek tragedy,
the fate of Oedipus. The reasoning of this pseudo-determinism runs
something like this: My character is one of the things which determine my decision in any case. Thus, my first act depended simply
upon my native*endowment and environment at the time; my second
act was influenced not simply by those two but by the first act, which,
in its results, was a modification of my original endowment. All these
.previous decisions enter into my present decision, which always hearkens back to my original factors of heredity and environment. My
decision is the cause of my act; my will or desire is what underlies the
outcome in any case, but my desire or will has been causally determined, and in this sense there is an absence of freedom. I can do
what I want to do, but being the result of circumstances beyond my
control, it is impossible that I should want to do anything else. It is
my criminal or other nature that underlies my decision in any given
case. My voluntary decision is determined by the whole past history
of the universe and my heredity and environment; though I can do
some things independently of what I am, nevertheless, what I am has
been determined for me.
As has already been intimated, by arguing in this way the determinist is surreptitiously appropriating most of the thunder of the freewillist. Thus the very argument that my character is one of the things
which operates to determine my decision in any case and that my
character began with my first choice, assumes that my first choice (and
all subsequent choices) was free. What warrant have we (if we take
the deterministic view) for saying that, as the man is himself one of
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the set of circumstances which led up to his decision in a given case,
that particular "set of circumstances" which comprised the man could
have swayed the whole, unless we assume that that "set of circumstances" was the free activity of mind?
Professor Palmer puts a similar argument in these words: "If my
present desire and puipose are altogether controlled by those which
preceded, the inner life is as inevitable as the outer and the operations
of my character no less fated than those of planetary motion. If we
understand character to include future possibilities together with past
realities, we speak the language of libertarianism. The point of interest in the whole controversy is whether a new event ever occurs,
whether divergence is conceivable from lines already laid down,
whether man has any true creative power. A consistent determinist
should deny all this as stoutly as ever a necessarian did. What has
been will be, he should say, and that alone. If seeming change occurs,
it is only in seeming. Forms alter, but the promise and potency of all
that can happen is already provided at the beginning. What this means
it is not easy to understand. If what has been controls what shall be,.
one would think it would control its seemings and its form no less
12
than its other features."'
To say that, though my will or desire is what underlies the outcome in any case, that will or desire was itself causally determined;
to urge that I can do what I want to, but being the result of circumstances it is impossible for me to want to do anything else, seems to
be barren quibbling. If it is impossible for me to want to do "anything else," what good will my "freedom" do me, and how, under such
limitations (supposing responsibility to rest solely on freedom of will)
can I be held responsible for a choice that is but illusory?
The popularity of the deterministic position rests largely on the
19th and 20th century tendency to scientific explanation-the search
for mechanical determinants of the phenomena of the universe, including man; the prevalence and popularity of the "cause-and-effect"
dogma. This view is not new. The Stoics looked upon the universe
as a unit in-which every part is so tied up with all the other parts that
it operates as a concatinated whole; and that is the conception of many
modern scientists, who, because they have found the "sway of mechanism" in those segments of nature which they have been able to study
with microscope and telescope have gratuitously assumed that the
human mind cannot in itself be a contributing cause. Such scientists
"2The Problem of Freedom, George Herbert Palmer, Houghton-Mifflin Co.,
Boston, 1911, p. 185.
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argue that as soon as we turn to the problem of explaining conduct,
we must consider causes, since there is no effect without a cause; thus
we rule out "freedom"-a thing cannot be both caused and free.
Kant's treatment of this difficulty has never been improved upon. He
pointed out that such an inquiry into causality can never get us anywhere, since it involves an "infinite regress, 'a pushing back of the
chain of causality indefinitely; for it is impossible ever to achieve the
final cause of the whole series by such argument.
Some determinists have carried their reasoning to its strict conclusion; being thoroughgoing "mechanists" their logic is of mechanical
rigor. They insist that the human being is a mechanism, or at most, a
"conscious automaton," and that all we can study of him is "behavior,"
which is by these thinkers said to consist exclusively of automatic
iesponses of "motor sets" to stimuli. They at least have the merit of
consistency. Those pseudo-determinists who speak of the "determinism" of heredity and environment being inevitable, and at the same
time argue about the "first free choice" and subsequent "choices" between alternatives may call themselves determinists, but such use of
terminology has contributed much to the confusion of the subject,
especially when applied to the social sciences.
For the determinist to maintain his position consistently and without masquerade, his argument must be stated as Professor McDougall
puts it: "Similar (or the same) causes produce similar (or, the same)
effects. This human decision is a similar effect, therefore it has a
-similar cause."'"
In this statement there is not insinuated the very
bone of contention, namely, the ability of man to "diverge from lines
already laid down," or conscious, purposive activity within certain
limits. As soon as "first choice" is spoken of, the determinist has
deserted to the camp of the enemy.
Such a correct statement of the determinist position carries its
own refutation. Professor McDougall succinctly states it as follows:
"This syllogism is obviously foolish. Both its premises are gratuitous
assumptions; and in no way can we establish premises from which the
determinist conclusion follows. If it be said that some such major
premise as 'all events are strictly determined or caused' is a necessity
of thought, we may point to the various scientists and philosophers who
tell us that any such assumption is ridiculous, that the notion of cause
and effect always has been obscure and muddled, incapable of being
clearly thought or expressed, and that, however useful it may have "
'8Ouiline of Psychology, William McDougall, Charles Scribner's Sons, New
York, pp. 446, 447.
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been and still may be in a limited way, it has had its day and now is
merely a clog on speculation." 14
If the above is the true position of the determinist, what is the
libertarian view? We said that in his camp, too, there is a babel of
voices.. But it may be said that the modem libertarian does not regard
the resolutions of the will as "bolts from the blue"; nor can we find
many who are uninfluenced by the progress of science and who regard
the will in the following extreme terms: "The free-willist believes that
over and above the particular acts of volition there is a certain entity
called the will, which is, as it were, a sort of personage within the
human person. This will is free. It is an autocrat. Various motives
appeal to it. It sits in'judgment over them, and 'decides' freely which
shall be followed. Diverse roads of action lie, before it: it 'chooses'
freely which one it will take. Goodness and badness are offered to it:
it 'prefers' the one rather than the other. The free-willist implies that
the will is a distinct entity whenever he ascribes 'freedom' to it.""' s
Doctor McConnell has here described a brand of libertarianism that
has few adherents today. It is questionable metaphysics and worse
psychology. Professor Palmer expounds this position and criticizes
it in the following words: "Extreme libertarianism, in the -form
known as the freedom of indifference, makes caprice its essential principle. We are free only when there is nothing to induce us to take one
course rather than another. . . . Causation of every kind must be
absent. . . . Such is libertarianism at its extreme, the so-called

liberty of indifference. It would be difficult to find an advocate of it
today, though determinists often put it forward as the only alternative
to their doctrine. Indeed, uninstructed and partisan determinists are
apt enough to speak of the whole doctrine of libertarianism as indeterminism, showing how little acquaintance they have with any other form
than that which denies motivation to action.

.

.

.

It should be the

first duty of every believer in freedom to see that he is relying on noth6
ing so fantastic and contradictory as this."'
In order to get rid of a belief in either extremes of fantastic And
contradictory theory-namely, the freedom of indifference, 6n the one
hand, and rigorous, mechanistic materialism, on the other-we must
turn to psychology for light.
p. 447.
IsCriminal Responsibility and Social Constraint, Ray Madding McConnell,
p. 135.
' 6The Problem of Freedom.
3.Id.,
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MENTAL CONCEPTS IN LAW

We have shown that much of the futility of argument about the
"freedom" of the "sane man" has been due to a confused or arbitrary
use of terminology. We have also intimated thai so long as this con-.
fusion persists it is difficult to discuss the practical effects on the criminal law and theories of penology of either 'freedom" or "determinism." Because of the confusion we find both sides claiming their
respective views as the basis of social institutions, especially the criminal law.
In resolving the question into. its true issue it was intimated that
what both camps must really turn to in connection with the practical
problems of the criminal law is a study of the nature of man. The
metaphysical problem, which Kant showed could not in its very nature
be proved, must be left to pure speculation. In the meantime we must
study the nature of man and the antecedents of behavior from the
psychological approach. Whether the feeling of capacity to act creatively in a purposive manner is an illusion or not can make no difference; we are all suffering from the same illusion if it is so. When
Pinal, Morel, Esquirrol, Despine, Maudsley, Lombroso, Mercier, and
others called attention to the antecedent factors of a criminal act;
when they pointed to duress of mental disease or to the individual or
social causative factors behind the criminal act, they certainly did not
intend to do away with all freedom of conscious, purposive activity,
even though they believed in "scientific determinism." They pointed
indeed to hereditary and environmental factors which often prove such
a drag up9n the power of individual self-assertion as practically to
nullify it; but they cannot, we believe, be said to have subscribed to an
out-and-out mechanistic causation in such cases, -without the interposition of some purposive, mental power.
Our notion of responsibility of a person for his anti-social acts is
then really bound up with the belief that most persons can more or less
choose between various lines of activity, that most persons, in other
words, can act purposefully in a more or less rational way, on the basis
of the innate nature of man, and to a socially acceptable minimum.
When they fail to achieve this minimum it is either because they deliberately chose such a result, or because through native mental defect,
disease, or the overwhelming pregsure of the external world, they were
actua'ly unable to exercise their capacity of choice. Considering the
"new psychology," we may admit that anti-social acts may sometimes
be the vicarious relief-expression of a repressed desire, or the resolu-
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tion of a "conflict" of subconscious desires taking the form of crime.
Yet this does not mean that all acts are caused this way; further, it is
possible to resolve such a conflict in a socially acceptable way under
proper psychiatric treatment and by the proper exercise of purposive
intelligence, so that it cannot strictly be said that there is mechanistic
causation here as there is in the physical realm. Indeed, there is purpose and logic and method even in the activity of such subconscious
desires; they are not mechanical "cerebrations."
The issue then becomes, for the practical purposes of the criminal
law, a choice between that school of psychology which regards man as
a purposive, creative being, capable of some self-direction, and the
modern radicals in psychology, who regard man as a machine or at the
most as a "conscious automaton." Any discussion of the relation of
human voluntary activity to responsibility for crime must employ the
terms "will" or "freedom of will" in the sense that they are used by the
law and psychology.
In this respect conservative law has shown herself much more
sensible than her more impetuous sisters-the experimental sciences.For, recognizing that "experimental determinism" (Jennings) assumes
as a working hypothe-sis the universality of causation and on the basis
of such hypothesis is every day finding brilliant examples of the apparent universal sway of mechanism, it nevertheless takes the common
sense view that this need not at all affect our practical' belief in human
freedom within certain limitations. It refuses to become entirely "behavioristic"; it attempts to plumb the mental factors behind the criminal act. But before examining such a psychological conception of
freedom as applied to the various theories of punishment which have
been advanced at one time or another, it is necessary to treat briefly
of the differ-ence of opinion between the Mentalist school and the
Behaviorist school of psychology. The former recognizes the reality
of mind and the creative activity of mind- as expressed in behavior. It
is difficult to see how under a purely behavioristic (mechanical-materialistic) conception of the human organism, however, there is any
1
room for even a residuum, of free, self-directive, purposive activity. "

A brief statement of elements of the criminal law will serve to
show how the problems of psychology upon which the Mentalistic and
Behavioristic schools differ fundamentally become important. "To
responsibility (imputability)," says Wharton, "there are, we must remember, two constituents: (1) capacity of intellectual discrimination;
" For a good exposition of the various schools of "behaviorism," see "Behaviorism and' Psychology," Dr. A. A. Roback, Cambridge.
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and (2) freedom of will."8 If there be either incapacity to distinguish
between right and wrong as to the particular act, 19 or delusion as to
the act, or inability to do or refrain from doing the act, then there is
no responsibility. The difficulty is practical. No matter what may be
our speculative views as to the existence of conscience, or of freedom
of action, we are obliged, when we determine responsibility, to affirm
20
both.
Some foreign codes, such as some of the Cantonal Codes of
Switzerland, expressly recognize these element. Lucerne, for example,
provides that the punishableness of an act, in itself criminal, pre2
supposes reason and freedom of will in the actor. '
Such reason and freedom of volition are ordinarily presumed
from the commission of an illegal act; but this presumption is of
course rebuttable. In practice the question of the existence of free
volition comes up only when, at a trial, the question of exemption from
normal criminal responsibility is in issue; and it ii, in the manner of
testing deviations from normal responsibility because of mental defect
or disease of one form or another that we get divergencies of opinion
among jurists and criminalists. It is this testing of deviations from
the rational, free-choosing, purposive individual which has caused, and
still causes, Inuch trouble in the administration of the criminal law in
such cases. But it is important to point out that if the law proceeded
on the basis of strict behaviorism, it would look only to the external
act and not concern itself with questions of deviations from normal
mental power.
For the commission of a crime there must be an illegal act with
"criminal intent." Two elements must co-exist: A. The existence in
the offender of a state of mind which is declared by law to be consistent with criminality; B. The voluntary commission of an act declared by law to be criminal, as a result of, or contemporaneous with,
that state of mind. The first condition by itself, constitutes guilt in
the field of ethics. But when the law requires the existence of the
second, the external act, it does not thereby aband6n the first. As
someone said, to illustrate the difference between ethics and law, when
'sHaving discarded "freedom" in the metaphysical sense, Wharton is here
referring to freedom in the sense of conscious, purposive activity.
19 This refers to knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the act; it
omits "ignorance of the law." "If ignorance of a law were defense to a prosecution for breaking such law, there is no law of, which a villian would not be
scrupulously
ignorant."--Wharton.
20
Philosophy of Criminal Law, p. 109; pp. 51-53.
21
See Oppenheimer, The Criminal Responsibility of Lunatics, for a good
summary of foreign codes on this subject.
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the great actor, David Garrick, declared to Doctor Johnson that whenever he acted Richard III he felt like a murderer, Johnson, as a moral
philosopher, was bound to retort, "Then you ought to be hanged whenever you act it." But the criminal law attaches only upon the comrnissipn of a criminal act, not upon internal feeling alone or an intent
without an act. Thus, if a man takes a coat from a stand intending to
steal it, and then finds it is his own, he commits no crime.
The great English jurist, Sir James Stephen, writing in 1883,
gives the clearest brief legal treatment of the psychological elements
of a crime, from the standpoint of the-jurist. Assuming that the act
is done by a person of competent age, Stephen would list the following
necessary elements in every crime:
1. The act must be voluntary, and the person who does it must
also be free from certain forms of compulsion.
2. The act must be intentional.
3. Knowledge in various degrees according to the nature of different offenses must accompany the act.
4. In many cases either malice, fraud, or negligence enters into
the definition of offenses.
Each of the above, volition, intention (and motive), knowledge
and malice, fraud or negligence may be affected by the mental disease
or defect of the offender. Stephen defines an action as "a group of
related motions of different parts of the body"; and he holds that
actions may be involuntary or voluntary, and that an involuntary action
may be further subdivided according as it is or is not accompanied by
consciousness. Involuntary actions are not only such acts as the beating of the heart and heaving of the chest, but such conscious acts as
coughing or the motion whichi a man makes to save himself from falling, or the struggles-of a person in an epileptic seizure. A voluntary
action, Stephen holds, is a group of motions accompanied or preceded
by volition and directed towards some object. This is what we mean
by "conscious, purposive activity." Stephen analyzes a voluntary action
in these words: "Every such action comprises the following elements:
knowledge, motive, choice, volition, intention; and thoughts, feelings
and motions adapted to execute the intention," the elements occurring
in the order enumerated. . . . "If there is no intention, if the movements of the body are not combined or directed to any definite end,
there may be action, but it is not voluntary action. A man receiving
news by which he was much excited might show his excitement by a
variety of bodily movement, as, for instance, by the muscular motions
which change the expression of the face, but the question whether they
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were* or were not voluntary would depend on the further question
whether they were intentional. A groan or a sob would usually be
involuntary; words spoken expressive of pain or pleasure could hardly
be otherwise than intentional if they conveyed a distinct coniected
meaning." More specifically, says Stephen': "Intention is the result of
deliberation upon motives, and is the object aimed at by the action
which has been caused or accompanied by the act of volition."
We regard the foregoing as a clear exposition of the mental elements involved in a criminal act. This is the sense in which intention
or "intent" (these terms seem to be employed interchangeably in the
legal reports) is used in the maxim, "a man must be held to intend
the natural consequences of his act." This again is in fact a rebuttable
presumption. The ma5cimum is necessary, however, because of the
difficulty of proving such a complex mental condition as intention;
but in the determination of what are or are not "the natural consequences of his act" in any individual case, it is apparent that evidence
as to the mental state which preceded and accompanied the-act is consciously or subconsciously taken into account, even though presumably
the "natural consequences" are considered with reference to the "average" or "normal" man placed in a similar situation.
The law's concern with the psychological elements of a criminal
act is further illustrated By its use of "intent" specifically, as an element of the definition of certain specific crimes whose degree of gravity
to the public security depends upon the intention with which those
acts-outwardly, i. e., "behavioristically," all alike-were actually committed. Thus in such offenses as wounding with intent to do grievous
bodily injury, forgery with intent to defraud, assault with intent to
kill, etc., the mental complexus comprising the intention becomes specifically important. But, as was suggested before, the intention is a
necessary concomitant of all purposive, voluntary action; and as all
crime must be such conscious, voluntary, purposive action, intention is
a constituent of all criminal acts. (Minor statutory offenses where no
intent is necessary are not considered important for our purpose.)
Bearing this statement of the more important mental elements
with which the criminal law is concerned in mind (and there are others
which are not so important for our purpose), let us consider which of
the two major schools of psychology best accords with the practice of
the developed criminal law.
Thoroughgoing Behaviorism, under the.influence of biological research, insists that all .human behavior can be explained exclusively,
and will ultimately be completely explained, in terms of the structure
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and automatic, mechanical functioning of the brain, nervous system,
musculature and glandular activity of the organism; in terms of chemical and physico-chemical reactions to stimuli. Even thought is conceived of as a complex, minute operation of the muscles of speech, in
the same way as all external behavior is attributed to the mechanical
response of "motor sets" or "bodily attitudes" to stimuli. Conation,
volition, desire are either not dealt with at all or explained as consisting of automatic responses to stimuli. All the higher mental integrations and functions are conceived of as complex systems of reflexes
which respond automatically to stimuli. Such words as "purpose,"
"consciousness," "striving'" "ends," "aims," "goals," "intention," and
many others of ethico-psychological significance and with which the
law deals and which common sense recognizes are not to be found in
the vocabulary of Behaviorism, strictly construed. Man is a machine.
The consequence is that if the machine is out of order and runs amuck
in a socially unacceptable way, there is but one thing to do, get it out
of the way.
It is not our purpose to enter into a lengthy statement of the Behavioristic views; the exposition of the subject can best be made by a
prominent Behaviorist himself,,whom we will let quote from his writings, some of the most characteristic passages:
"The psychology which I should attempt to build up would take
as a starting point, first,-the observable fact that organisms, man and
animal alike, do adjust themselves to their environments by means of
hereditary and habit equipments. These adjustments may be very
adequate or they may be so inadequate that the organism barely maintains its, existence; secondly, that certain stimuli lead the organisms to
make the responses. In a system of psychology completely worked out,
given the response the stimuli can be predicted; given the stimuli the
response can be predicted.'22 And again: "Behavior on analysis is the
separate systems of reactions that the individual makes to his environment. When we come to study the mechanics of such adjustments we
find that they depend upon the integration of reflexes connecting the
receptors with the muscles and glands." 23 He says further: "Since,
according to my view, thought processes are really motor habits in the
larynx, improvements, short cuts, changes, etc., in these habits are
brought about in the same way that such changes are produced in other
motor habits. This view carries with it the implication that there are
2
2John
Rev., 1917,
23J. B.
delphia, J.

B. Watson: "Psychology As the Behaviorist Views It." Psychol.
Vol. XX, p. 167. See also his "Behavior," N. Y., Henry Holt, 1914.
Watson: "Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist," PhilaB. Lippincott Co., 1919, p. 13.
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no reflective processes (centrally initiated processes) : The individual
is always examining objects, in the one case objects in the now accepted
sense, in the other their substitute, viz., the movements in the speech
24
musculature."
If "there are no reflective processes (centrally initiated processes)," it is difficult to see on what basis offenders can be held either
morally or legally accountable for their anti-social acts.
By "implicit habit responses," or thinking, says Watson, "we
mean ° sub-vocal talking, general body language habits, bodily sets or
attitudes." And again: "A man may sit motionless at his desk with
pen in hand and paper before him. In popular parlance we may say
he is idle or 'thinking,' but o .r assumption is that his muscles are really
as active and possibly more active than if he were playing tennis. But
what muscles? Those muscles which have been trained to act when
he is in such a situation, his laryngeal, tongue and speech muscles
generally. '25 This whole view of thinking as language habit or "subvocal talking" is piercingly criticized by Bertrand Russell in his article,
26
"On Propositions: What They Are and How They A,'ean.
The inadequacy of the behavioristic concepts and methods in the
field of psychiatry and in the field of our special interest in this discussion-the determination of the mental condition of the accused who
pleads insanity as a defense to crime-is well indicated by Jelliffe:
"There can be no doubt that psycho-neuroses have brought about
'habit twists' which have become a faulty equipment in the patient's
reactions to life. To acknowledge this is by no means to lose sight of
the relation of the habit twists as only forms of expression of a self
that is more than a complex and co-ordinated system of language and
bodily habits.

.

.

.

The very fact that the patient cannot phrase in

terms of words the habit twists which have become a part of his
biological equipment would imply that there is something more than
merely bodily habit twists." The data of psychopathology must convince one that "Speech is no more capab.e than any other mechanism
of taking the place of affective functioning, but is one of the vehicles
through which this is given discharge, an implement which the same
' 27
affective impulses first formed and are still perfecting for their use.
As mental states and mental concepts of knowing, intention, motive, negligence, rashness and many others important in the criminal
24

Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It," note p. 174.
- 2Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, pp. 14, 15.
2
Aristotelean Society, Supp. Vol. II, pp. 8, et seq.
27S. E. Jelliffe: "Dr. Watson and the Concept of Mental Disease," Jour.
Philos. Psychol. & Sci. Meth., 1917, Vol. XVI, pp. 269-270.
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law are thus shown to be rigidly excluded from a thoroughgoing behaviorism; the requirement of the law that to constitute criminal
responsibility there must be "capacity of intellectual discrimination"
and freedom of volition cannot be satisfied by such a discipline. If all
human action is reflex action, if it is the result "merely of the play of
nervous currents, started in the sense-organs by stimulations from the
physical world and propagating themselves through the jungle of the
nervous system, finding always the paths of least resistance according
to purely physical principles," then the conscious-volitional basis of
both moral and legal responsibility must be abandoned; and either all
men must be exempt from responsibility on the ground that they are
automata with no control over their responses to stimuli, no power of
purposive planning and execution of their purposes, or, arbitrarily,
machines which interfere with the smooth running of the social machine, must be "parked" out of danger or scrapped entirely without
regard to the "rights" of the machine or the equities of any individual
case. Behaviorism, in other words, is unsatisfactory as a basis either
for ethics or .law.
As intention and volition are the two concepts with which the lav
on the subject of criminal responsibility of the insane is mainly concerned, and, as Behavioristic psychology makes no provision for these,28
a brief description of them from the standpoint of psychology as the
science of mind is necessary.
We have seen that free volition in the sense of conscious, purposive activity must be assumed by the law. In assuning these and
acting upon such assumption, the law is doing no more than is popular
thought and popular morality; indeed all social intercourse rests upon
such assumption. As Professor McDougall points out, "neither 'the
Will' nor 'Conscience' is a faculty, an entity of any kind, distinct from
the rest of the personality. 'The Will' is character in action; and
'Conscience' is moral character-character developed under moral
guidance, character in which the moral- sentiments are duly incorpo28
To say. as the Behaviorist probably would, that "intention" consists of
"implicit lankuage habits" would not serve the purposes of the law; nor would
it give any reason why, as Doctor Roback has indicated, "implicit" language
habits should involve greater culpability than "explicit," external behavior. For
it is well known in the law that a mere declaration of intention is not always or
necessarily an indication of the actual mental condition of intention or "intent"
which the law requires as an ingredient of a crime. The requirement of "intent"
is to take account of the need of the culprit having foreseen the consequences
of his act or having known that his act would result in injury or might thus
result; and, further, to take account of the defendant's capacity restrain the
commission of an illegal act even after he had envisaged it-in other words, of
the defendant's capacity for conscious, purposive activity (including capacity
for inhibition of acts which he knows are illegal).
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rated in the system of the sentiments and, through the medium of the
sentiment of self-regard, are given due weight in all moral issues;
character consolidated by habitual and consistent decision and action,
in accordance with the promptings of the moral sentiments and of an
unyielding self-respect." 29 A little reflection will convince the reader
that this is esserftially what is meant by character in everyday thought
and conversation.
Professor McDougall's views are convincingly proved by the fact
that once self-respect is destroyed, character and volition are weakened, as in the case of a victim of alcohol or drugs, and, more strikingly, by the war "shell-shock" cases, where, as he points out, loss of
"will power" was often traceable directly to a severe shock to a soldier's self-respect, as where he suddenly realized his terrible fear in
the face of some crisis in a battle and that he could not therefore live
up to the social ideal of the time and place and circumstances. "The
self-assertive impulse, made strong and delicately responsive by much
and varied exercise, may come to the reinforcement of any other
motive and may support us to the bitter end in any task, trivial or
serious, to which we have once set our hands." 30
For the description of motive and intention and their distinction
from the standpoint of the science of mind, the following extract from
Professor McDougall is instructive:
"Suppose that you are sitting in a concealed spot near a lonely
road, and that you observe an acquaintance, X, walking alone along
the road. Suppose, further, that you see a needy-looking man coming
in the opposite direction; that, when the two meet, they stop and.
exchange some words; and that X put his hand in his pocket, hands
some money to the other man, and passes on. How will you interpret
that behavior of X, . . . You will be able to infer that the man
begged alms of X, and that X gave them; further, you can infer that
X, when he put his hand in his pocket, intended to find a coin and to
give it to the beggar. About his intention, then, you are clear. But
what about his motive? That remains problematic. Here we have a
clear illustration of the obvious fact that motive and intention are
entirely distinct facts. Yet many psychologists and some lawyers deliberately confuse them, or assert that a motive is merely an ulterior
intention. There is no distinction of more importance for the understanding of behavior.
2

442.

.

.

. If X, when he put his hand in his pocket,

90utline of Psychology, Win. McDougall, Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1923, p.

30

d., p. 445.
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had pulled out a pistol instead of a coin, and had put a bullet through
the other man, the question of motive would have become a matter for
the lawyers to discuss.31 The intention to shoot at the other man might
be confidently assumed, though the motive remained absolutely un32
known.
Proceeding further in this analysis, he says: "On seeing the coin
given, at least three possible motives might be guessed with equal
plausibility. You might guess that X was a timid person and that he
gave the coin because he was afraid of the other man, afraid of being
assaulted by him if he refused to give. Secondly, you might guess that
X was a pitiful or kindly man, and that he was moved to give by pity.
Thirdly, if you were 'inclined to be cynical,' you might guess that X
is a man who likes to feel himself superior to others and who enjoys
any situation that enhances his feeling of superiority to others and
their sense of his power over them. . . . In each case you would
be assigning an emotion as the motive of the action; and, in so far as
your guess'was a good guess, you would have explained the action as
completely as the psychology of the common-sense tradition can pretend to explain it. Of course, your explanation might be less simple;
you might guess that all these three emotions were at work together,
that X was a little bit afraid, a little bit compassionate, and a little
proud, all at once; and, if he were a stranger to you, it would be
safest to assume some such mixed motives or emotions. . . . Common sense identifies emotions with motives. Common sense, when it
.has named correctly the emotion dominant during any man's action,
holds that it has explained the action, -made it intelligible, in general
terms. . . . If any further explanation is required, it must take the
form of explaining why that man experiences and displays that emotion
under the circumstances of that moment. This stage of the explanation
involves the description of his 'character'; and an adequate understanding of his character can be attained only by considering both his
' 33
hereditary constitution and the course of 'his development.
Just as in the case of the criminal law, Professor McDougall holds
that "in this all-important matter of the explanation and understanding
of human behavior or conduct, .
.
'common sense'" is right, .and
"many of the psychologies and philosophies of the past" are wrong,
31
Motive need not ordinarily be proved as an element of the crime; it only
becomes important indirectly as throwing light on the required "criminal intent."
32Id., pp. 121, 122.
33
1d., pp. 122-125.
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"because they have rejected the common-sense procedure and offered in
3
its place a variety of fantastic theories."
Sketching his own theory of human conduct, in which "the cue
offered by common sense was frankly accepted as a working hypothesis," Professor McDougall gives a brief summary of the views he first
advanced in his fundamental work, "An Introduction to Social Psychology," in these words:
"Emotion was regarded as a mode of experience which accompanies the working within us of instinctive impulses. It was assumed
that human nature (our inherited inborn constitution) comprises instincts; that the operation of each instinct, no matter how brought into
play, is accompanied by its own peculiar quality of experience which
may be called a primary emotion; and that, when two or more instincts
are simultaneously at work in us, we experience a confused emotional
excitement, in which we can detect something of the qualities of the
corresponding primary emotions. The human emotions were then
regarded as clues to the instinctive impulses, or indicators of the motives at work in us. . . . A little dose of intelligence may modify
the impulsive power of emotion or of instinct." 35
Considering human'personality, then, as a "federation of organic
impulses" distinguished from the lower animals by the degree of
intelligence which can be interposed to modify these instinctive tendencies and their corresponding emotions, we get nearer to what the law
actually regards to be the makeup of human personality. These impulsive instincts which urge for gratification are shared by man with
the lower animals. They are modified or kept in check originally by
their own inward antagonisms, as where two impulses arise simultaneously (as the urge to fight and the drive to run at the sight of
danger) ; but with the organization of social life other considerations
than the mere gratification of the individual's desires prompt to action.
Primitive man, as the lower animals, simply destroyed any obstacles
in the way of gratification of these primitive, instinctive urges. As
social life progressed the conflict between that set of instinctive trends
comprising the egoistic instincts and the federation of organic impulses
comprising the social instincts became more acute. In law it represents
the stage where social rights or interests were beginning to be set off
34

1d., p. 126. For a clear, elementary exposition of the various schools of
psychology, as well as a convincing critique of those schools which "lend themselves readily to alliance with the mechanistic view of organisms which denies
the reality of purposive action," especially thorough-going Behaviorism, see the
introductory chapter of the Outline of Psychology.
35
1d., pp. 127, 128.
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against individual rights or interests. The history of criminal law
consists in an ever-widenifig consideration of "mitigating circumstances," of consideration, after the teachings of the Correctionist
School of Criminology, of such facts as age and mental condition in
the evaluation of criminal responsibility. The recognition of the nature*
of man, of his vast variety of motives (or emotional phases of primitive instinctive desires), and of the important fact that "according to
the measure of his intelligence he can weigh them, estimate possible
consequences, and follow one and inhibit the others" ;a and the recognition by man that though the primary instincts may cry for satisfaction, such satisfaction might "harm him in his property, liberty, in his
life for the injustice and injury -he is doing to others"-all this is at
'the basis of responsibility for anti-social conduct that is punished by
society. But these are not the only considerations which should enter
into the measuring of social responsibility. Other factors will be considered below.
We have gone so much into detail on this subject, because we
believe such a view of human nature-a view which common sense
and the law recognize and which psychology and the other social
sciences can refine and make more useful for the purposes of penology
-to be the most promising from the standpoint of criminal responsibility. We agree with McDougall that neither the old wine of "reflexes" and "conditioned reflexes" poured into the new bottle of Behaviorism, nor the "ideo-motor" theory of human conduct, which regards that mysterious entity, an "idea" as a motivating agency, nor the
theory of "psychological hedonism," which regards pleasure and pain
as the only motives to human conduct, nor the conception of that
much-abused entity, "the will" as something distinct and self-sufficient
(which has formed the target of Determinism), nor the view that.
"reason"' as a "faculty" is the spring of action, nor the "unconscious" ' 37
as a distinct and separate entity without regard to other data of metal
life-not any one of these correctly explains human conduct, and not
one of these can be a point of departure for estimating criminal responsibility. Professor McDongall's procedure on the basis of what
he calls "the common-sense cue" is not only justified by the theory of
evolution and the facts of behavior in animal and man, as he convincingly shows in his work, 38 but without his general view of the
36
The Psychology of Misconduct, Bernard Hollander, London, George Allen
& Unwin,
Ltd., pp. 178-180.
37
Unless we conceive the entire system of instincts as constituting the "Unconscious," and take account, further, of the other data of mental life.
"38The Outline of Psychology. See also his epoch-making work, An Introduction to Social Psychology (14th Edition), Boston, John W. Luce & Co., 1921.
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nature of human action criminal law especially would be without a
sure basis; unless the law were converted into an arbitrary and capricious weapon, or unless it reverted to the stage of the lex talionis.
If there is such a thing as criminal responsibility, based on moral responsibility, it must take account of the instinctive nature of man and
his capacity to modify the impulsive, primitive power of instinct by
the injection of some degree of intelligence.
In primitive times, penal law was objective; it c6nsidered the
external deed alone, for which it had a pre-established schedule of
penalties. Primitive law ignored the personality of the agent; it was
therefore the legal condition par excellence of a behavioristic psychology. No account was taken of "extenuating circumstances," of mental
defect or disease and its influence on free volition. No account seems
to have been taken of moral obliquity, which rests upon recognition of
the capacity of conscious, purposive activity. There was just the fact
of anti-social behavior vaguely recognized as such, without inquiry
into the extent to which this behavior might have been due to the enslaving influences of heredity or developmental and environmental
factors. "Intention" had little to do with it. The Wergild, a stated
price in requital for a private injury, and the sacrifice to the gods by
way of expiation in the case of public injury, were not based on questions of the nature of behavior, purpose, intention, volition, negligence,
malice or any other mental concepts with which the law deals today.
What was the act and who was the author thereof? were the only
pertinent queries. All this was perfectly natural in a primitive state,
where bloodshed was the rule and where men were in the habit of
giving free play to their instinctive desires.
We are, not here concerned to go deeper into the difference between the mechanistic-materialistic psychologies and the views expressed by Professor McDougall. It is enough for our purpose to
reiterate that the law does proceed on the assumption that such'terms
as are popularly designated as impulse or instinct, voluntary activity,
desire, motive, intention, deliberation and others are generally understood to describe certain mental data, and that these must be considered in a discussion of crime; further, that behaviorism or any
other mechanistic psychology cannot satisfy the demands of the law on
this score.A9 Indeed such terms and what they connote are affirmatively
40
disavowed by behavioristic psychology.
39See, for example, Phychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, by
Watson.
40
See "Behavior," by J.B. Watson, pp. 7-10. Doctor Robacek's chapter on
Behaviorism and the Law in his "Behaviorism and Psychology" gives an excel-
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It is true that these terms as used in the law are not always
synonymous with the views of psychology; but this is rather a matter
of the necessity of the introduction into the law of clearer views as
to the nature of the human mind and of the springs of conduct than
a refutation of the fact that the law deals with such concepts. That
requirement of a union of act and intention which is necessary to constitute a criminal act is a recognition of the fact of conscious, purposive activity in man and of the fact that this capacity may be weakened or destroyed by mental disease. It is true, too, that in many
cases the volitional element of the act is disposed of by a legal "presumption"; but this is inherent in the difficulty of proving human
conduct and its motives. If the law concerned itself only with external
behavior, it would never have required an inquiry into motive and
intention;, and, for those cases where our imperfect psychology is
unable to give us data as to intention, it would never have felt the
necessity of "presumptions" as to the, mental state necessary to constitute a criminal act; it would have looked no further than the external
behavior, as did primitive law.
There is, moreover, a grave danger in acceptance of the purely
behavioristic attitude by the criminal law. Saleilles 41 makes an important point in this connection that most of us are wont to overlook.
After discussing the fact that the primitive "objective penal law, in
which responsibility has no place, becomes a penal law based upon the
notion of taking one's chances," he warns against the return of law
to "an objective attitude," under which the "theory of taking one's
chances tends to reappear." I-He points out that professional criminals
still take the atitude that having chosen an occupation that involves
risks, "they realize the risk which they incur. If they steal, they pay
for it, as a debt, by so many months of imprisonment. Society appears
as a creditor to whom a debt is due. With the debt paid one may
begin anew; the score is canceled." Our law today also accepts too
cheerfully its role of creditor to whom a debt is due which can be
canceled by a definite term of incarceration fixed in advance as was
lent, brief exposition of the dependency of criminal law or mental concepts.
"Suppose we accepted behaviorism in its extreme form . . . it would behoove
us, as Watson has done, to eliminate all mental states from our scientific discussions. Since intention is a mental state, we should be obliged to give up
this term, too, until the great day comes when the physiological, mechanism is
discovered that the intention will be translated into. Meanwhile, what are the
jurists to do? Wait for the transformation and not bother about such 'assumed
realities,' or lay themselves open to the charge that they are dealing with entities
which41 psychology (behaviorism, of course) does not recognize?-p. 138.
The Individualization of Punishment. (Modern Criminal Science Series),
Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1911, pp. 33, et seq.
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the schedule of penalties in the lex talionis. We are still, from the
angle of the judicial sentence based on fixed statutory penalties, treating crimes instead of criminals. True, our so-called "indeterminate
sentence" (not indeterminate in the real sense, because it fixes limits)
permits some degree of individualization on the part of the judge and
parole boards; but there is still too much of the cut-to-the-same-pattern
view of all criminals committing the same offense.
Perhaps the idea of a debt due to society may legitimately' form
one of the bases of penology; but when it is the only basis, punish42
ment is little better than "a sublimation of the vengeance motive.
More undesirable, punishment conceived of as the payment of a predetermined debt is abortive. It is well known that the "old-timer"
who has done several "bits" before is usually the best behaved prisoner, the "trusty" playing the waiting game cheerfully,- with the sole
businesslike view of reducing his little debt to society by some "snatch"
of time off for good behavior.
III.

FREEDOMN

OF WILL AS

CONSCIOUS PURPOSIVE ACTIVITY,

AND

THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT

Thus far we have attempted to show that most of the disagreement between determinists and free-willists is due to a confusion of
terms; that the metaphysical problem does not today have much influence either on broad social policy or on the action of individualsjudges or penologists-that the practical issue is between mentalistic
and behavioristic psychology; and that the criminal law today proceeds upon a subjective, mentalistic basis. In what follows it is proposed to show that all theories of punishment that lay any claim to
morality have also proceeded on such a basis. Purposive activity and
free action in the psychological sense are interchangeable concepts for
our purpose. Freedom-means creative capacity; and creative capacity.
is essentially involved in the notion of purposive action. Henceforth
when we use the term "freedom of will" we are expressing the idea
merely that mind, in addition to its function of contemplative intelligence,-is an active, directive ageacy; but in holding this view ve of
course by no means overlook the influence of hereditary equipment,
environmental influences and conscious and unconscious motives in
influencing and circumscribing what would otherwise theoretically be a,
chaotically free mind or will, whose single purpos6 would be reckless
freedom of action.
42

1nsanity and the Criminal Law, William A. White, New York, The Mac-

millan Co., 1923, pp. 16, 17 and 31.
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In the above sense we think it can be safely asserted that belief
in freedom of will has always been a necessary assumption of developed (as opposed to primitive or only partially developed) systems of
criminal law. Otherwise punishment for a violation of law could
hardly be morally justified. If, for example, the view of the determinist prevailed in criminal jurisprudence, the criminal act being only
one of a series of natural effects, it would be as, absurd to hold the
agent accountable to the law and punishable for his crimes as to hold
some inanimate object accountable for having been employed by a
criminal in the commission of a crime; if, on the other hand, we adopt
the extreme libertarian view (which has always been the target of
determinism), the conception of the will as completely isolated from
character, as a mysterious power of totally unmotivated choice standing part from.the personality, then not the personality ought morally
to be held responsible to the law but this mysterious external entity.
The jurist schooled in the psychology of purpose will of course
readily recognize psychological freedom at the base of imputability
or criminal responsibility. But even those jurists and criminologists
who may be called "mechanistic" in their psychological views must
tacitly ssume that it is possible to refrain from reacting to stimuli in
ways which the law as recognized as constituting criminal offenses.
And this freedom of choosing the method of reaction to stimuli or of
inhibiting certain reactions is, as we have often asserted, what we mean
by the free activity of man. By not always stating the position of the
free-willist in clear terms some exponents of theories of punishment
have insisted that the free will question does not enter into their
theories at all; and in so far as they meant freedom of will in the
abstract "high metaphysical" sense they have no doubt been justified
in taking such a view. But wherever they referred to purposive, free
activity in the psychological sense their positions are untenable.
Some criminologists and penologists are really purposivists,
although, like some metaphysicists, they insist upon calling themselves
determinists, by giving an altogether unreasonably wide definition to
the term "free will," a definition which the believer in the purposive
activity of mind justly refuses to accept. Thus the great jurist, Korkunov, 4 3 insists that, "We must put the question categorically, 'Is the
will free or not free?' It cannot be considered as halfway free. It
comes under the principle of causation or it does not. When the question is thus put it is very simple, and the answer by no means doubtful.
To maintain that the will is absolutely free is in such formal contra43

General Theory of Law, Translated by Hastings: 1909.
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diction to the beit known facts that it today hardly finds any longer a
serious defender." He then resumes the -well-known arguments against
"freedom of will." But an examination of his, definition shows that
he is assuming that unwarranted, chaotic freedom of some mysterious,
extra-personal entity, which we showed to be unjustified.
On the proposition that a belief in freedom of will in our sense'
described above is at the basis of criminal law and of the rationale of
punishment, let us consider the views of some representative schools
of penology, omitting "transcendental" theories, however, on the
ground that, stripped of their disguise of metaphysical terminology,
the "Leitmotiv" in all such theories-as the theological view of punishment as a religious duty; or the expiatory theory; or Kant's view of
punishment as a moral necessity; or as a logical complement of crimeis the idea of justice in the abstract.
Oppenheimer, in his "Rationale of Punishment" (pp. 267-8) gives
a summary, in simple terms, of the different attitudes which the State
takes towards crime and criminals up 6n the various political, hence
practical, theories of punishment. He holds that under all theories,
except the preventive theory of punishment, the State virtually says to
the criminal or prospective criminal, "Do what you like. I lie low and
wait until you have committed an offense. Then I come down upon
you and do what I consider to be my duty. I cannot prevent your
going wrong; you are a moral, i. e., a free agent. But neither am I at
liberty to alter the . . . consequences of your choice. For my line
of action is but the necessary moral complement of your conduct."
These theories, therefore, avowedly recognize freedom of will.
What Oppenheimer calls the theory of justice holds, "Your choice
has shown you to be a danger to society, and I have to deal with you
in such manner as the interests of society demand." This may be
conceived of as a "mechanistic" or "behavioristic" theory; for the law
does not, according to this theory, make any inquiry as to whether the
act was free or determined; it simply waits for punishable acts to
occur and then punishes them. But can punishment be morally justifiable if a person is not free to act as he wills ? We will see later that
there have been attempts to base punishment on an apparent disregard
of this question, and, moreover, to justify such disregard.
The state, according to other, more specific, political theories, says
Oppenheimer, holds somewhat like the following:
1. The deterrent view: "I will punish you by making an example
of you." This recognizes that fear is a motive influencing action. But
some criminologists, as we have shown, confuse the idea of motivated
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activity and the concept of determinism; free action does not mean
unmotivated action.
2. The theory of disablement: "I will make it impossible for you
to offend again." This view, too, we believe, can only be morally
justified by a recognition that the prisoner was at the time of the act a
free-willing person in the psychological sense. There have been
attempts, however, to justify it on the ground of safety to the group.
The only remedy thaf consideration of safety to the group can justify
is the placing of the offender where he cannot repeat his offense; the
extreme, measure of physical disablement is not necessary for the
avowed purpose of protection of the group. Justice requires that more
than the safety of the group should be considered; that the judicial
(and legislative) process should be a more or less conscious bzdancing
of the interests of the group and those of the individual.
3. Theories of legal and moral reformation: Here the state
says, "I will teach you such a lesson that you will not be likely ever to
forget it," or, "I will reform you by casting the devil out of your soul."
In order for lessons to have an effect, however, it is imperative for
this school to believe in the freedom of the individual to choose the
right and avoid the wrong, after the right course has been pointed out
to the prisoner; or, to plan future action in the light of past experience
and under the influence of certain motives, and to be free to carry out
that plan.
4. The doctrine of prevention: This holds, "What is the use of
waiting until a crime has been committed? Every crime is a shock -to
the peace and good order of society. Therefore, we must prevent all
crimes or nip them in the bud." But this is really not a view of
punishment, but of an anticipatory process. As far as it is concerned
with the prevention of recidivism by one already imprisoned, it, too,
must be based on belief in freedom; for this school advocates, among
other devices, indeterminate sentences for the mentally sound offender,
who committed the offense as a normally free-willing being; and indeterminate incarceration in an insane hospital, under proper medical
care, for the offender of unsound mind, who is liable to re-embark
upon a criminal career if discharged perfunctorily at the end of a predetermined, definite term of incarceration, without regard to whether
he is in a fit condition to take up the broken threads of social relationship. And the change of treatment from imprisonment for the mentally sound offender to hospital care for the mentally unsound offender,
we take it, is a recognition of the relative freedom of action of the first
and lack of freedom of the second.
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It will be seen from the foregoing sketch of theories of punishment that in one form or another the leading schools of penology must
implicitly pstulate freedom of will in the sense of conscious, purposive
activity of mind. Let us now look at the views of one or two criminologists 'who claim to base punishment on other grounds than freedom.
Even so acute a thinker as Tarde seems to confuse the capacity
for conscious, purposive activity-a matter of psychology-with freedom in a high, metaphysical sense. He deplores the fact that legislators share in the "prejudice which indissolubly binds these ideas
' 44
(i. e., metaphysical freedom and moral responsibility) together."
Thus quoting Article 51 of the German Penal Code to the effect "that
at the'very moment of the act the perpetrator must have been in pos-'
sion of his 'liberty of will,' " he deplores the fact that "this requirement has as its inevitable result the acquittal of many dangerous
malefactors. It is becoming more and more difficult for the medical
expert, called in an ever increasing number of cases to pass upon the
mental condition of the accused, to vouchsafe the opinion that he was
free to will otherwise than he did. If he expresses this opinion he is
' 45
doing violence to his scientific beliefs."
Of course the code section in question is not discussing freedom
in the metaphysical sense, but "normal" capacity for conscious, purposive choice between alternative lines of action, which, when it is
destroyed by mental disease, excuses a defendant from criminal responsibility. The question of metaphysical 'freedom is unanswerable;
the question of deviation from normal capacity is one for the psychiatric expert.
Reviewing all the arguments for freedom in the metaphysical sense
Tarde puts punishability on the basis of "individual and social similarity." He claims, like all determinists, that the "affirmation of free
will is in contradiction to science" (showing here that he is discussing
the philosophical question of freedom); but much like Kant he adds,
"yet to deny it is to contradict conscience." By his doctrine of "similarity" he means a theory which presumes to base responsibility on
the notion of personal and social identity, holding that in order that
the doer of an act contrary to the wish of others may have the feeling
of guilt, and in order that in spectators and judges there may arise a
corresponding feeling of indignation, the following two things are
44Penal Philosophy, Gabriel Tarde, Translated by Rapelje Howell, Modern
Criminal Science Series, No. 6, Boston, Little, Brown & Co., p. 15.
451d., pp. 15, 16.
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necessary: First, the author must attribute to himself the act in question and not blame it on organic or physical causes outside of his
person; and, secondly, a man must judge himself or be adjudged as
forming part of the same society as the judges and the victim belong
to. Responsibility, in other words, exists only when the author of the
deed preserves his "real and personal identity," and when between him
and the social milieu of a particular time and place, there exists a sufficient number of resemblances that will awaken his guilty feeling and
make him admit his responsibility.
Tarde illustrates the working of this hypothesis by insisting that
a hypnotized man is irresponsible not because he is not free, but because he has momentarily lost his identity, and not he himself is acting,
but he, altered by suggestion. Again, he holds a person insane is not'
responsible, not because of lack of freedom to act intelligently, but
through lack of both personal and social identity, claiming that insanity
"alienates, separates, and destroys both identities." But this ingenious
theory is not always applicable, as Garofalo 6 has shown: For example, the criminal who was insane before the crime and continued so
afterwards would be preserving his "personal identity" throughout
the act, yet he is not always responsible legally. To this Tarde might
reply that this criminal had lost his social identity throughout the
period of the act, he'having been alienated socially as soon as he began
to exhibit such extreme symptoms of mental alienation as -would distinctly and dangerously differentiate him from his fellows.
Ie Quiros47 points out that a better argument against Tard's view
is that this irresponsibility on the ground of lack of personal or social
identity can in theory (and probably could in practice) be applicable
to all emotional acts, including even mere angry outbursts immediately
preceding the act. Personal identity, too, is, as a matter of fact, really
never completely lost even in mental disease; Tarde's assumption that
an absolutely new personality takes the place of the old one is not
warranted in the case of many mental diseases. But we believe the
best argument against Tarde's notion to be that he is merely giving us
the old difficulty in new words; for in practice we cannot see that it
would be any easier to decide the question of individual and social
identity in each case than to gay whether the culprit was free and
responsible, or irresponsible.
46

Quoted by DeQuiros, Modern Theories of Criminality, Modern Criminal

Science
Series No. 1, p. 145.
47
1d., pp. 145, 146.
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The great German psychiatrist and criminologist, Aschaffenburg,
in his "Crime and Its Repression"48 (pp. 241, et seq.), says that "legislation is built upon the basis of the doctrine of the free determination of will." The penal code for the North German IFederation, he
says, for example, holds that, "The right of the state not only to
adopt measures of security against the criminal, but to punish him,
rests on the general human opinion that the mature and mentally
sound man has sufficient will-power to repress impulses to criminal
acts, and to act in accordance with the general consciousness of right."
Assuming such capacity (which we have called conscious, purposive
activity) to be what is meant by philosophers when -they discuss "freedom of will," he proceeds to attack the view that eminent criminologists ordinarily have held, that "free-will" is the "basis of criminal
law." He mentions the fear entertained by some moralists that without
belief in "freedom," "the old* belief in a man's responsibility for his
acts" must be abandoned; and hastens to remind us that both St.
Augustine and Luther denied the doctrine of free-will. He insists
that "with the deterministic view it is still possible to maintain the responsibility of a man for his acts-though from an entirely different
standpoint," first, however, disposing of the vexing question of freedom of will in the metaphysical sense, as if for all time, by the usual
arguments to the effect that "the phenomena which we call- acts of
will must be preceded by a causal activity. This activity goes on in
our brain, hence is dependent on the latter's condition." A "free will"
that acts without cause, or, as he says, "more comprehensively, without motive, does not exist." As to this argument we hav'e already
said it is not warranted to assume that to act with consciousness of
purpose, in the light of past experience, and toward more or less definitely conceived goals, means to act without motive. To hold with
Aschaffenburg and with so many who use free action and unmotivated
action interchangeably would be to speak of some mysterious, chaotically-free, but absolutely reasonless or intelligenceless creature. To
take Aschaffenburg's definition of freedom would be to fall into the
fallacy of championing a fantastic and contradictory view against
which Professor Palmer warns us.
Aschaffenburg asks the question, assuming he has proved universal cauality, "What right have we to make a criminal responsible for
acts not the expression of free-will, but depending on the organization
and development of the brain, on intelligence, experience, and emotional excitability, on the one hand, and, on the other, on external
48Modern Criminal Science Series, No. 9.
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conditions ?" He then bases punishment upon an analogy he finds in
the whole organic realm, namely, that every organism in the world of
nature responds to stimuli of sufficient strength, that is, reacts to
irritations; and that the motives of each of these defense reactions
are well-being and self-preservation. "This is true of .the single cell
as of the highest aflimal." He concludes by agreeing with Ferri:
"The natural foundation and the fundamental principle of the repression of crimes exists solely in the necessity for self-preservation,
which applies to every individual- and every social organism." Crime
in this view, however, is considered only from the standpoint of an
injury to society, and punishment is "only the necessary social reaction
against it." It is from this starting point alone, Ferri and Aschaffenburg insist, "that the struggle against the criminal must be carried on."
A similar view is held by Hamon. 49 "The individual and society
feel the need to react against a nuisance by suppressing the criminal
or preventing his acts. The only responsibility is social responsibility.
.

.

.

'Society has the right to defend itself and to preserve itself.

Man is responsible because he lives in society, and only because of
that social existence.' We are thus brought, Hiamon points out, to the
acceptance of the old English legal maxim that everyone, whatever his
state of consciousness, always acts at his own risk and peril. The
insane and abnormal are, socially, necessarily responsible.

.

.

.

We

should replace the term 'social responsibility' by 'social reaction.' Such
social reaction manifests itself in preventive treatment, and in social
hygiene and prophylaxis, applied not only to the agent, but to the
causes which produced his acts." 50 This, as we said above, is Ferri's
view expressed in his "La Sociologie Criminelle"; a similar stand is
taken by McConnell.
There are several objections to this-view as we see it. Logically,
on the analogy of the immediate reaction to stimuli which Aschaffenburg uses, to say that "such social reaction manifests itself in preventive treatment, and in social hygiene and prophykixis, applied not
only to the agent, but to the causes which produced his acts," is a
non sequitor. Prevention, anticipation of the irritating stimulus to the
social organism, has no place in such a view, logically. Secondly (and
related to the first objection), such view treats only the crime, disregarding the criminal, except as an object of punishment, regardless
of his actual responsibility, mental status, motives, or any other extenuating or aggravating circumstances of the individual case. Such
49La Risponsibilit6, Archives d'Anthropologie Criminelle, Nov., 1897.
5OThe Criminal, Havelock Ellis, New York, 1903, pp. 365-366.
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a view is strictly behavioristic and lobks only to the external act and
regards all similar crimes as -arguing the same imputability on the part
of the agents. Thirdly, this view disregards the data of psychology
entirely, and it is even questionable from the point of view of social
psychology, for groups react, not always mechanically, in the same
way and to the same degree to the irritating stimuli of recalcitrant
members; but even on the part of the "many-headed tyrant" there are
varying types of reaction.5
Finally, such a theory is not in harmony
with the actual facts; it does not express the true nature of that process of "social engineering" which the law is more or less consciously
endeavoring to carry on. It overemphasizes the social interest in the
general security, just as in the 18th century the social interest in the
individual life was overemphasized. In such view there is no room
for compromise. But the actual legal process is consciously or subconsciously a constant compromise, a "balancing of interests." 2 As a
theoretical basis for treating with crime, such view at the best can only
justify our taking into custody of the offender; it tells us nothing as
to our justification for, or nature of, actual penological treatment, once
he is in custody.
This review of theories of punishment would indicate that in one
way or another we are forced to recognize that the problem is largely
psychological, and that the basis of responsibility is largely the recognition that all of us have to a greater or less degree the innate capacity
'for conscious, purposive activity.
But even the psychological approach is insufficient, standing alone,
to insure a just estimate of responsibility in the individual case. To
measure the resposibility of any alleged malefactor according to any
yard-stick, be it chaotic freedom or purposive capacity, is impossible.
What we can do, however, is proceed from a correct view of the makeup of human personality and at the same time take into account in
the individual case not only differences of mental constitution, but the
more or less immediate environmental influences which contributed
their share to the criminal act. The health, economic and social status,
heredity of the defendant, his mental and moral education-these and
many other factors ought justly to be weighed in determining responsibility and penal treatment. To some extent, although too haphazardly, this is actually being done today. Investigations by probation
5
'We believe one must admit this, even though one does not go so far as to
accept the concept of a "group mind." See The Group Mind, William McDougall.
52
See Outlines of Lectures on Jurisprudence, Roscoe Pound, p. 89. See also
Demogue, Notions fondamentales du droit prive, pp. 170-200.
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officers and social workers prior to disposition of' the case, investigations and study within penal institutions and some attempt at individualization of treatment-all these improvements no doubt weight the
complex elements of responsibility to some extent. The greatest promise,. however, lies in a well-organized, capably-manned, well-equipped
psychopathic-sociological laboratory attached to the criminal courts,
and at the same time supervising penal treatment in a directive way.
(t.
The criteria of responsibility involve so much that is intricate, uncertain, metaphysical, and are themselves properly subject to
variations by reason of environmental and disease conditions, by reason of innate defects and differences in social suggestibility, that, for
the purposes of general discrimination and the development of a gen53
eral standardization, they are tfioroughly impracticable."
Healy and others have shown the complexity of causation at work
in the production of anti-social conduct, and that general causation
theories are of little value. He has also recognized that the study of
causes of crime must proceed from a study of the mental factors of
the criminal act in each individual case.. "Whatever influences the
individual or his offense must influence first the mind of the individual
It is only because the bad companion puts dynamically significant pictures into the mind, or because the physical activity becomes a sensation with reproduction in psychic life, or the environmental conditions
produce low mental perceptions of one's duty towards others, that
there is any inclination at all towards delinquency."5 4 Might we not
also say that this inquiry into the mental factors of the individual
criminal act and their hereditary and social setting is the only rational
basis for estimating responsibility, and that such procedure must replace pure speculation as to abstract freedom of will? The same
objection that Healy raises against general theories of criminality may
be raised against general theories of responsibility. No two offenses
are indicative -of exactly similar responsibility on the part of the perpetrators, although behavioristically considered they both present the
same outward aspect. The capacity of every individual to act in a
socially-acceptable manner depends upon a host of subtle and complexly interrelated influences; hence the responsibility of each individual is different. But the human capacity for conscious, purposive
activity is the most important of these influences, even though this
capacity is of different degrees in different people.
53
The Individual Delinquent, William Healy, Boston, Little, Brown & Co.,
1915, p. 20.
54
1d., p. 28.
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Our point is simply that general theories of responsibility based
on philosophical speculation alone can get us nowhere for the practical
purposes of the criminal law; that in studying the causative factors
of the criminal act of the individual offender according to the Healy
methods we are not only finding the causes of the trouble in the individual case and the means to be employed to remove them, but, from
the point of view of pure ethics alone, we are actually getting nearer
to estimating the measure of the offense in terms of moral responsibility than has ever been achieved by pure speculation, unrelated to
scientifically acquired data as to hereditary, developmental and environmental influences and unrelated to any problem of the individhal
case. In discussing freedom or determinism "from a high metaphysical point of view," we are speaking in abstractd,we are discussing
"man" in vacuo apart from the social setting of any individual man.
"L'Jlwinme isolM et individuel n'cst qu'une abstraction qui n'existe que
dans les livres de "philosophie. IIl n'y a de rel que d'Huinanit." 55'
Though Healy, Glueck 56 and others insist upon the psychologicalpsychiatric point of departure, they recognize that, while basic, the
mental factor is not the only one. If a psychological-psychiatric examination alone were to determine responsibility, and a method could
be devised whereby individuals could be graded in responsibility for
similar offenses on the basis of their individual mental ages and their
individual personality make-ups, the task of estimating responsibility
would not be so difficult. But, as we said, a thorough sociological
investigation of the individual case is necessary. Thus Healy, in his
path-blazing study of the individual delinquent, found that in 162
cases out of 823 in which the complex causative factors of delinquency
based on thorough psychological, psychiatric and sociological investigation were penetratingly analyzed, defective home conditions were a
primary causative factor; in 394 out of the 823 cases, defective home
conditions were a secondary causative factor. In 556 out of 823 cases,
defective home conditions were thus found to be largely responsible
for delinquent conduct. 5 7 In face of such findings how can we limit
our estimate of responsibility to a psychological examination alone?
55C. de Bligni~res, Exposition Agreg6e et Populaire de la Philosophie et de
la Religion
Positive, Paris, 1857, p. 465.
5
6Bernard Glueck, The Mentally Defective Immigrant, New York Medical
Journal, Oct. 18, 1913. See also his "Study of 608 Admissions to Sing Sing
Prison, Mental Hygiene, Jan., 1918, and "Types of Delinquent Careers," Mental
Hygiene,
April, 1917.
5
7The
Individual Delinquent, pp. 130, 131. As to the importance of the
mental approach, see also his Mental Conflicts and Misconduct, Boston, 1917, and
Studies in Forensic Psychiatry, Bernard & Glueck, Criminal Science Monographs,
No. 2, Jour. Crim. Law and Criminology, Chicago.
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Indeed such sociological factors as poverty and defective home conditions cannot be divorced from mental factors, upon which they have
a direct influence.
The important conclusion is that the question of responsibility,
like the question of crime, is an individual question. It is linked up
with individual treatment, and such treatment may very well, in certain cases, include punishment together with the other instruments 6f
criminal therapy. None can seriously question the right of society to
defend itself against individual, anti-social behavior. But once the
offender is segregated, the question of the nature and degree of penal
treatment to be meted out is inseparable from the whole question of
the mental and moral make-up of the individual offender, his developmental and environmental background, the circumstances under which
the offense was committed, his response to various types of penal
treatment, and other such questions which can only be intelligently_
answered by a scientific study of the offender. This is no less true in
the case of definite mental disease as a defense to crime.
For the problem of the criminal to be effectively, economically and
in general rationally treated, the modem psychopathic-sociological
clinic is an indispensable integral part of the whole socio-legal machinery that is concerned with crime. Such a clinic should have the
leading role both in the pre-sentence examination of the offender and
in the question of his disposition; finally, such a clinic should have
general supervisory jurisdiction over penal and disciplinary treatment,
its nature and length, probation and parole. To examine an offender
and prescribe a program of treatment without the opportunity to supervise and modify such treatment, as necessary, and without the power
of determining the length of such treatment, has little practical value.
As the courts, police system, and institutional treatment of offenders
are all concerned with different angles of the same problem, the criminal clinic, police, court-system and penal institutions could more effectively be combined under one general supervision, such as a general
ministry of justice. But whether this is so or not, the work of clinics
in dealing with juvenile delinquents has been so promising that such
institutions dealing with all offenders and having closer connection with
penal treatment ought to be generally used. Under such a scheme the
"criminal responsibility" of the offender who pleads "insanity as a
defense" could be as thoroughly and impartially determined in his case
as in all other cases, once a jury found the fact as to whether he committed the criminal offense or not, or once the commission of the act
was confessed.

CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

Until such time as the whole problem of the criminal insane' is
treated on more rational lines, certain improvements which can be
made more immediately, both in the "tests" of criminal responsibility
and in the procedure in such cases, ought to be adopted after a thorough study of the subject. Professor Keedey and the Committee of
the Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology that recommended the
Expert Testimony Bill have already taken an important step in the
right direction, and the constant interest of public-spirited lawyers and
physicians cannot fail to achieve a much saner treatment of this vexing
problem than is now characteristic of many jurisdictions.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

Gathering together the loose threads of the foregoing discussion,
we will summarize the points involved. We first considered the relation of the metaphysical- problem of "freedom of will" to psychology
and to criminal responsibility. We found that while, conceived metaphysically, this problem is actually not considered by the law in practice, it has had some influence on theories of punishment. Nevertheless, the confusion of terminology in discussions of this metaphysical
problem seems to have prevented the arguments as to freedom or
determinism from having any marked effect in criminal administration.
Moreover, what the law really implies by "freedom" is the power of
conscious, purposive activity possessed in varying degrees by all of
us. The metaphysical question, as such, it is forced to leave to philosophers. Further, considering some of the more generally quoted arguments on the question of "freedom" in the metaphysical sense, we
found that the disagreements on these questions were largely due to
the gratuitous assumption that because events in the physical world
are caused, mind cannot itself be a cause.
Turning to the nature of human activity, of which crime is but a
branch, we found that Behaviorism and its methods are wholly inadequate to supply the answers as to mental states that precede or accompany the criminal act that are required in all definitions of crime; and
this is especially true when insk.nity is pleaded as a defense. On the
other hand, that psychology which recognizes man's capacity for conscious, purposive activity, but at the same time does not ignore the
contributing influences of hereditary, developmental and environmental
influences in the causation of crime, was found to supply the needs of
the criminal law.
"Freedom of will" was then used in the sense of conscious, purposive activity, and it was shown that such a concept is explicit or
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implicit in the various theories of punishment, including even those
theories whose exponents deny it as a basis. The theories of punishment based on "social reaction" were examined and criticized as inadequate. Finally it was shown that as general theories of criminality
are inadequate, so, too, general concepts of "responsibility" can get us
nowhere. As the most effective instrument for ascertaining both the
degree of responsibility (and therefore, of punishability) and the entire penological program of the individual case, the clinical study of
the individual offender-psychologically, psychiatrically and sociologically-was suggested; and it was recommended that this device be
extended to all criminal courts-adult as well as juvenile--and its
scope enlarged to include supervision of penological treatment, probation and parole. In the meantime, the need of reformation both of
substantive and procedural law was alluded to. The basis of responsibility is not condition, but a process; a process of scientific study of
the factors of criminality in the individual case, and of the balancing,
by trained, experienced scientists, of the individual and social interests
involved in each individual case, and with reference to the ideals of
our day and age.

